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COMMENTS
"It's Not Polite to Ask Questions"'
in the Boardroom:
Van Gorkom's Due Care Standard Minimized
in Paramount v. QVC
PATRICIA A. TERIANI
I. INTRODUCTION
Ownership and control. In publicly held corporations,2 these
attributes are separated: shareholders own the corporation; di-
rectors, in theory, manage the corporation; and the chief execu-
tive officer and his management team run the day-to-day opera-
tions of the corporation. 3 In most corporations, however, control
is vested in the hands of management, not the board of direc-
tors. The problem lies in the distinction between authority and
power.4 While directors of a Delaware corporation are given stat-
utory authority to manage the corporation,5 for the most part
1. Myron Magnet, Directors, Wake Up!, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 85, 86 (quoting
California Public Employees' Retirement System General Counsel Richard Koppes, and
explaining that "a culture of quietism reigns in many boardrooms") [hereinafter Magnet].
t J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, May 1996.
2. For a general discussion of the fiduciary standards for directors of nonprofit cor-
porations, see David W. Barrett, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for
Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967 (1996).
3. Of course some directors and managers own shares in the corporation.
4. The distinction between authority ("autoritas") and power ("potestas") can be
traced to the Romans. Hugh Parker, Re-Empowering the Board, DiREcTORs & BDS., Win-
ter 1996, at 4.
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See infra note 33 for the text of this provi-
sion. While reference to various state laws are made herein, Delaware law provides the
focus for this comment.
The state of Delaware has long been the leader in corporate law because of its pro-
gressive approach to corporate governance. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FuNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN BusiNEss § 13.6.2 (1989) (explaining that the "core of uniformity" in state corpo-
ration statutes is partially due to Delaware's leadership "in developing significant princi-
ples of corporation law") [hereinafter HAMILTON]; David A. Vise, Delaware Court Changes
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the authority is unexercised. For a number of reasons, corporate
boards have not taken an active role in governance, permitting
management to usurp the actual power to manage the
corporation.
6
A director's failure to actively participate often surfaces in
the form of a failure to become adequately informed prior to en-
gaging in board action, and this failure constitutes a breach of
the duty of care.7 The task of becoming informed is fundamental
to the director's actions, because the best interests of the share-
holders cannot possibly be protected unless the director is in-
formed about the matter to be decided. Traditionally, the duty of
care played a secondary role to the duty of loyalty and, to a cer-
tain extent, was "intended primarily as an aspirational state-
ment."8 Courts were primarily concerned with actions of the cor-
porate director that evidenced self-dealing,9 and absent such
acts, the courts would apply the deferential business judgment
Rules of Takeover Game, WASH. POST, June 16, 1985, Business Section, at F1 (noting the
Delaware Supreme Courts "unique position of rendering opinions that have a powerful
national impact"). For an interesting analysis of roles played by strategic design and his-
torical chance in the development of Delaware's corporate leadership, see Leo Herzel &
Laura D. Richman, Foreword to R. FRANKLIN BAL(OTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELA-
WARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS lix, lxiv-lxv (1988 & Supp.
1989) (observing that the three ingredients of Delaware's "design" include a pro-
transaction corporation law, liberal jurisdictional rules that extend personal jurisdiction
to reach prime defendants and a specialized court system that handles neither criminal
nor tort cases). This warm corporate climate has made Delaware the state of incorpora-
tion for a majority of major U.S. companies. Pat Widder, Time Inc. Case Another Test for
Outside Directors, Cm. Tam., July 9, 1989, § 7, at 1 (noting that "when Delaware rules,
boardrooms listen") [hereinafter Widder]. Roughly one-half of companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") are incorporated in Delaware. Milo Geyelin, Dela-
ware Proposes Business Court to Speed Resolution of Disputes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
1993, at B3.
6. For an in-depth discussion of the reasons for board inaction, see infra Part IV.
7. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d. 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Directors of corporate boards
are fiduciaries to both the company and the shareholders, and as such, owe two primary
fiduciary duties - the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET A&,
TnE BUSmESS JUDGmeT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1 (3d ed. 1989
& Supp. 1991) ("In the simplest terms, the duty of care requires that directors exercise
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances,
and the duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and self-dealing.") [hereinafter BLOCK].
8. WILLIAM A- KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 150 (5th ed. 1993); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham
& Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Uni-
fled Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAw. 1593, 1597 (1994) (contend-
ing that "everyone knew that only the duty of loyalty mattered") [hereinafter Cunning-
ham & Yablon].
9. See generally Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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rule.10 This deferential treatment arose out of the judiciary's rec-
ognition that corporate directors were much better equipped to
make complex corporate decisions. 1
Smith v. Van Gorkom12 represents the Delaware Supreme
Court's clearest expression of the duty to become informed and
offers strong support for board activism. Strangely, however,
Van Gorkom and the need for information were overlooked by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Communications,
Ina v. QVC Network, Inc. 3 In Van Gorkom, directors of the Chi-
cago-based Trans Union Corp. were held personally liable for vi-
olating their duty of care in authorizing a friendly all-cash
buyout. 14 The court found the Board members grossly negligent
for failing to "inform themselves of all information reasonably
available to them ... .15 Emphasizing the decision-making pro-
cess, the court condemned the procedures as hasty and unin-
formed 6 and remanded to the Delaware Chancery Court to de-
termine the appropriate damages.' 7
The Delaware Legislature responded to the Van Gorkom de-
cision by enacting a law which allows a Delaware corporation to
amend or draft its certificate of incorporation to limit or elimi-
nate a director's personal liability in damages for duty of care
violations. 8 Such amendments require approval of sharehold-
ers19 and do not affect a shareholder's ability to sue for damages
10. The business judgment rule is a presumption that board decisions are made "on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that [an] action [is) in the best
interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Her-
bert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions
and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAw. 29, 30 (1986) ("The traditional appli-
cation of the business judgment rule reflects the hesitancy of the courts, in the absence
of self-dealing, to become involved in board decision-making... .") [hereinafter Wander
& LeCoque]. See discussion infra Part 11.
11. Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 29-30.
12. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
13. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
14. William B. Glaberson & William J. Powell, Jr., A Landmark Ruling That Puts
Board Members in Peril: They're Being Held Accountable--Even Financially-for Bad
Corporate Decisions, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 56.
15. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
16. Id. at 875.
17. Id. at 893 (requiring the Court of Chancery to "conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine the fair value of the shares... [and enter) an award of damages... to the
extent that the fair value of Trans Union exceeds $55 per share").
18. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1994). See infra note 130 for the text of
this statutory provision.
19. Any amendment to the certificate of incorporation of a Delaware corporation re-
quires the approval of a majority of shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991).
889Fall 1996]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
for breach of loyalty.20 Because the statute is phrased in terms
of "monetary damages,"21 however, suits seeking equitable relief
for breaches of due care survive the statute. This fact is signifi-
cant because injunctive relief is often the remedy of choice for
shareholders who seek to enjoin a sale or merger.
22
Rather than Van Gorkom and information, the Paramount
court chose to focus on Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.23 and profit maximization. In Revlon, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court enjoined certain defensive measures
adopted by the target corporation, ruling that the measures con-
stituted a breach of the duty owed to shareholders. Once a sale
of the company became inevitable, the target's directors were
transformed into "auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders... ."" Instead of taking that course of
action, the Revlon directors locked in a particular bidder. The
court held that the Board's action halted the auction without
any substantial increase in benefits for the shareholders, and
thus deprived the shareholders of the highest available share
price. The directors were held to have violated their duty of loy-
alty because the merger agreement protected the interests of
noteholders, while sacrificing the interests of the shareholders.2
In Paramount v. QVC,26 the court emphasized the Revlon
profit maximization duties, 27 and while chiding the Paramount
Board's "deficient" process, 28 and charging them with a failure to
become adequately informed,29 the court failed to afford proper
attention to this crucial and initial requirement. The references
to the duty to become informed could have been consistently
20. § 102(b)(7).
21. Id.
22. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1215 (1988) [hereinafter
Hanks].
23. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
24. Id. at 182.
25. Id. The noteholders were those shareholders who agreed to sell their shares to
Revlon in exchange for notes with restrictive covenants, as part of the company's stock
repurchase plan. For a further description of the notes and their holders, see infra notes
148, 151, 153-54.
26. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
27. In addition, the court took great pains to distinguish Revlon from Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Because the Time-Warner
transaction did not involve a "fundamental change of corporate control," the enhanced
judicial scrutiny of the Revlon line of cases did not come into play. Paramount, 637 A.2d
at 46 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)).
28. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51.
29. Id. at 50.
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based on Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court's most clear pro-
nouncement of the duty of care. In fact, Van Gorkom could have
been the key precedent upon which the Paramount court ana-
lyzed the Paramount Board's breach of fiduciary duty. Any ques-
tion of profit maximization should have been secondary, because
a target board of directors clearly cannot obtain the best price
for its shareholders when it is ignorant as to which bidder is ac-
tually offering the best price. The court may have overlooked the
strong connection between the actions of the Paramount Board
and those of Jerome Van Gorkom and the Trans Union Board. It
is also possible that the court decided to downplay the role of
Van Gorkom because of the extensive negative attention that
the decision generated.30 It is certainly true, however, that the
Paramount court's minimization of Van Gorkom's due care prece-
dent reflects the court's hesitancy to force outside directors to
second guess the very executives and managers who placed
them on the board.31 It was easier for the court to condemn
Board conduct that violated both due care and profit maximiza-
tion duties, rather than condemn the directors for allowing cor-
porate managers to convince them that the hostile bid was un-
worthy of consideration.
3 2
II. THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE
In Smith, Revlon and Paramount, the Delaware Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether the decisions and
related conduct of such boards would be protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. The business judgment rule has been de-
scribed in varying forms in Delaware law, but is repeatedly re-
ferred to in connection with the statutory provision 33 which
30. See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
31. But see Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1141 & n.7 (Del. Ch.
1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) for the proposition that one of the Delaware Su-
preme Court's "clearest messages" is that blind reliance on top management by outside
directors is risky business. Amazingly, the chancellor cites Paramount as support for
this contention. Id at n.7. See Parts V, VI and VII for analysis that squarely contradicts
this view of the Supreme Court's message.
32. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1257
(Del. Ch. 1993).
33. DEL CODE AmN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). Section 141(a) provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers
and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter
shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons
891Fall 1996]
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states that a corporation is to be managed by or under its board
of directors." Traditionally, the business judgment rule acted as
a presumption that favored directors and protected them and
their substantive business decisions from judicial scrutiny.35 The
rule presumes "that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company."36 Under the traditional application, the party
challenging a board's actions carries the initial burden of prov-
ing that the directors violated their fiduciary duties.37 This evi-
dentiary requirement has in the past "resulted in a rather leni-
ent judicial review of business decisions."38 If, however, the
challenging party successfully rebuts the business judgment
rule, the burden shifts to the directors who must show that
their actions were entirely fair.39
The business judgment rule stems from the judicial recogni-
tion of the realities of business decisions. 40 The judiciary real-
as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporatfon.
34. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1980) ("The 'business
judgment' rule evolved to give recognition and deference to directors' business expertise
when exercising their managerial power under [section] 141(a)."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d. 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a)."); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("Under Delaware law, the business judgment
rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in... § 141(a)... .); Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The business judgment rule is an
extension of these basic principles.") (referring to DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)).
35. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
36. Id. See also BLOcK, supra note 7, at 12 ("The business judgment rule's presump-
tion shields corporate decision-makers and their decisions from judicial second-guessing
where the [rule's elements] are present - (1) a business decision, (2) disinterestedness,
(3) due care, (4) good faith, and (5) according to some courts and commentators, no
abuse of discretion or waste of corporate assets.").
37. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). See Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 143 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) ('The judgment of the directors in fixing the terms
and conditions of [a] sale is entitled to the presumption in its favor that it was exercised
honestly and in good faith.").
38. Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 30.
39. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1988); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
40. Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 29. Some critics of the business judgment
rule argue that a- complex business decision, by its very nature, is not something that
can be reviewed. New York City attorney Bayless Manning sets forth his view of the
"real-world conduct of directors," and maintains that most non-directors are completely
ignorant as to the way the decisional process works. Bayless Manning, The Business
Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477,
1480-83 (1984) [hereinafter Manning]. "Courts and the public must understand that
quite commonly, a director will go along with a business proposal that he does not really
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ized that it was unable to effectively assess complex corporate
decisions in comparison to the corporation's directors.41 Conse-
quently, a Delaware court will not "substitute its own notions of
what is or is not sound business judgment"42 in place of the di-
rector's superior judgment.43 The business judgment rule also
recognizes the role of the outside director, and the fact that he
or she may devote a limited amount of time to the company."'
Consequently, these part-time directors are not held accountable
merely because their decisions turn out badly. 5 The business
judgment rule acknowledges that "risk evaluation and assump-
tion" are inherent in business decisions6 and both play an im-
like." Id. at 1490. Manning offers his version of the director's thought process:
"I do not like this proposal. It seems risky and I believe other uses for the
same resources would be more promising. But I may be wrong; I respect the
contrary views of my colleagues, and I have to accord great weight to the
CEO's strong support for this project."
Id. Manning realizes that the public may be shocked by his revelations. See id. at 1480.
This very element of surprise, however, is why Manning believes that the duty of care
element of the business judgment rule is "analytically unsound." Id. at 1478. 'The whole
concept of negligence and of 'reasonable man' presupposes as a predicate a clear concep-
tion of what the person is doing, and a community understanding of normalcy about how
he should do it. Both those pieces are missing in the case of the work of corporate direc-
tors." Id at 1494. See also Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1441 (1985) (asserting that information gathering is
costly and that "investors want managers to spend an additional dollar on information
acquisition only to the point where there is an additional dollar generated from better
decision making") [hereinafter Fischel].
41. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 30.
42. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of directors
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed
if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.").
43. Kristin A. Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A
New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIs.
527, 534 (1987) [hereinafter Linsley].
44. Generally speaking, inside directors are those directors who also serve as of-
ficers of the company, while the involvement of outside directors is limited to their ser-
vice on the board. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 29 ("Because the corporate
director does not make a full-time commitment to the operation and affairs of the corpo-
ration, he may make decisions in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation
that eventually prove to be erroneous.') (citation omitted). Bayless Manning recognizes
the same restraints on a director's time, but argues that the duty of care element of the
business judgment rule does not realistically account for those limitations. Manning,
supra note 40, at 1481. Manning cites a 1982 survey that depicts the average director of
a publicly held company as devoting roughly 1.5 working days per month to his board
position. Id. (citing KoRN FERRY INT'L BD. OF DIRECToRS, Tenth Annual Study 9 (1983)).
45. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
46. Wander & LeCoque, supra note 10, at 29. But see Fischel, supra note 40, at
1439 (arguing that the business judgment rule's justifications are inadequate and that
the rule's rationale, and the "limited role of liability rules" in this arena rest on "several
factors, including the cost of contracting which makes it extremely difficult to distin-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
portant role in protecting decisions from review when they are
made by informed and uninterested directors.47
While the traditional application of the business judgment
rule placed the evidentiary burden on the party challenging a
board's action,4 the advent of complex business transactions re-
sulted in a shift of that burden with respect to certain transac-
tions. Cheff v. Mathes49 held that when a board of directors used
corporate finds to purchase corporate shares, the directors must
initially justify that such action was taken primarily to benefit
the corporation.50 The directors must prove that there was "rea-
sonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveness existed" because of the stock ownership of a particu-
lar party.51 That burden is satisfied by "a showing of good faith
and reasonable investigation."52 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co.,53 the Delaware Supreme Court added to the nature of
this threshold burden by requiring that the board of directors
prove that the defensive measure was "reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."54 Directors are called upon to satisfy this bur-
den "because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interest, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders." 5 Upon satisfaction of this
threshold burden, the board's decision and related conduct will
be measured by the business judgment rule and the evidentiary
burden shifts back to the challenging party.
56
guish adequate or reasonable performance from a breach of fiduciary duty"); see also
Manning, supra note 40, at 1482, for his assertion that the business judgment rule's
duty of care cannot possibly be flexible enough to allow for the excessive uncertainty and
risk-taking that is inherent in every business decision. "The decisions that the business-
man must make are fraught with risk, and he is quite accustomed to making these deci-
sions in a hurry on the basis of hunch and manifestly sparse data. The businessman and
the board of directors thrive or die in a sea of uncertainty." Id.
47. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
48. See supra notes 37-38.
49. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
50. Id. at 554. The rationale behind the burden shift is that using corporate funds
to eliminate a threat to control of the corporation requires that directors show that they
were not motivated solely by a desire to remain entrenched in their positions. Id.; accord
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
51. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
52. Id.
53. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Unocal decision was handed down on May 17,
1985, id., just months after the Van Gorkom opinion of Jan. 29, 1985. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
54. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
55. Id. at 954.
56. Id at 958.
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The business judgment rule is by no means a stagnant prin-
ciple as can be seen by the changes in its application. Commen-
tators have attributed the modifications in part to the increased
confidence on the part of the Delaware judges who have become
"more willing to insert themselves into corporate decisionmaking
.... 7 Others have concluded that "[w]hereas once the courts
would have deferred to directors' decisions as sacrosanct busi-
ness judgments and questioned them only if the outcome were
egregiously bad, the courts have now begun to look at directors'
decisions as punctiliously as they might a criminal conviction
and find fault with them almost eagerly."58 This latter character-
ization refers to the landmark Smith v. Van Gorkom case.
59
III. THE DUTY TO BECOME INFORMED: SMITH V VAN GoRKoM
As a condition precedent to securing the protection of the
business judgment rule, directors must satisfy the "duty to in-
form themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all ma-
terial information reasonably available to them."60 Delaware law
measures the performance of this duty by a gross negligence
standard. 61 It is by this standard that the actions of the Trans
Union directors were condemned by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.62
Trans Union was a diversified holding company involved in
the rail car leasing business that faced the problem of insuffi-
cient taxable income to offset its large investment tax credits.
63
Trans Union's chief financial officer suggested the idea of a
leveraged buy-out and the figure of $50 to $60 per share was
suggested as a price at which such a transaction would be finan-
cially feasible, in light of the cash flow necessary to service the
debt that would likely result.64 Without consulting the board of
57. Hanks, supra note 22, at 1208.
58. Leo Herzel et. Al., Next to Last Word on Endangered Directors, HARv. Bus. RzV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 38.
59. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also A.A Sommer Jr., Di-
rectors Under Fire, ABA J., June 1992, at 94.
60. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A-2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
61. Id. Other jurisdictions that apply the gross negligence standard include Mary-
land, Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 340 A.2d 225, 236 (Md. 1975) ("gross or
culpable negligence?), and New York, Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (App. Div.
1962) ("negligence so gross as to amount to a breach of trust").
62. 488 A.2d at 873. This decision reversed a Chancery Court determination that
the business judgment rule had been satisfied. Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL
8774, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982).
63. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
64. Id. at 865.
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directors, Jerome W. Van Gorkom,65 Trans Union's Chairman
and CEO, approached an acquaintance and corporate acquisition
expert, Jay A. Pritzker, and proposed $55 per share as a feasible
buyout price.66 In negotiating the deal, Van Gorkom requested
that Trans Union be free to accept any better offer and Pritzker
acquiesced, conditioned upon a treasury stock purchase agree-
ment that allowed him to buy 1,750,000 new Trans Union
shares at market price67 and sell at a higher price if any other
bidder acquired the company.68 After a series of meetings be-
tween Van Gorkom and Pritzker, Van Gorkom scheduled a spe-
cial Board meeting for Saturday, September 20, responding to
Pritzker's demand that the Trans Union Board act on his offer
by September 21.69 Just prior to the Board meeting, Van
Gorkom called a senior management meeting where he disclosed
the offer and its terms, but provided no written copies of the
merger agreement. 70 Management's reaction was negative; the
price was criticized as low, the treasury stock agreement as a
lock-up and the all-cash terms as having potentially adverse tax
consequences for low-basis shareholders.71
65. Jerome Van Gorkom was a certified public accountant and an attorney. Id. Ironi-
cally, the Chancery decision highlighted Van Gorkom's extensive acquisition experience
and thorough familiarity "with acquisition procedures, valuation methods" and pre-
merger negotiations. Pritzker, 1982 WL 8774 at *1. The Delaware Supreme Court found
it "noteworthy" that Van Gorkom was "then approaching 65 years of age and mandatory
retirement." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
66. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864. Note, however, Van Gorkom's contention that he
did not initially intend to elicit an offer from Pritzker; "rather, he says, he wanted
Pritzker to either confirm or dispel Van Gorkom's own views as to the attractiveness of
Trans Union to someone like Pritzker." David Elsner, Ruling In, Jury Still Out on Trans
Union: Van Gorkom Makes His Case, Cm. TaIB., Feb. 8, 1987, § 7, at 9 [hereinafter Eis-
ner]. Such a contention seems unlikely, since the court found that Van Gorkom had in-
structed Trans Union's controller to calculate the feasibility of a buyout at an assumed
per share price of $55 and specifically told him "that he wanted no other person on his
staff to know what he was doing." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
67. "The common stock of Trans Union was traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change.... Its high and low range for 1980 through September 19 (the last trading day
before announcement of the merger) was $381/4-$291/2." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866,
n.5. After negotiation, Pritzker agreed to lower the Trans Union treasury stock purchase
agreement to one million new shares at a price of $38, seventy-five cents above the close
of market price on Sept. 19. Id. at 867.
68. Id. at 866.
69. Id. at 867.
70. Id. Pritzker's attorney drafted the merger agreement, which was to be reviewed
by Van Gorkom's attorney, "sometimes with discussion and sometimes not, in the haste
to get it finished." Id.
71. Id. at 867-88. A "lock up" is corporate jargon for "the setting aside of securities
for purchase by friendly interests in order to defeat or make more difficult a takeover at-
tempt." BLAcIes LAw DICTIONARY 940 (6th ed. 1990).
Fall 1996] ASIUNG QUESTIONS IN BOARDROOM 897
Minutes later, Van Gorkom made a twenty minute oral
presentation to the board of directors, in which he reviewed the
tax problem, discussed his initial meeting with Pritzker and out-
lined the proposed merger.7 2 He did not, however, reveal how
the price was derived or his role in suggesting it to Pritzker.73
Copies of the merger agreement were supplied, but their
delayed delivery prohibited any review prior to the meeting.
7 4
Rather, Van Gorkom related the offer's terms. Van Gorkom
framed the issue for the Board as not whether $55 was the
highest price obtainable, but whether it was a fair price about
which the shareholders should be given the chance to vote.
7 5
Furthermore, outside legal counsel retained by Van Gorkom ad-
vised the Board that they could be subject to legal action for
failing to accept the offer and that they were not legally re-
quired to obtain an outside fairness opinion.7 6 Trans Union's
chief financial officer disclaimed prior knowledge of the proposal
and indicated that his own feasibility study did not constitute a
fair price finding, while the Trans Union president offered sup-
port for Van Gorkom's presentation.77 The Board consequently
voted to approve the merger agreement after only two hours of
debate.7 8 That same evening, while at a social event, Van
The tax concerns proved to be significant, particularly to Alden Smith, the Smith v.
Van Gorkom plaintiff, who was a low-basis shareholder. He "had sold his business to
Trans Union in 1960 for 150,000 shares of Trans Union stock .... For him, the all-cash
deal meant having to pay mammoth capital gains taxes Elsner, supra note 66, at 9.
72. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
73. Id
74. Id. Pritzker was to pay $55 per share for all of the outstanding Trans Union
shares, contingent on Pritzker's financing by October 10. Id. at 878. According to Van
Gorkom, Trans Union could receive other bids for ninety days, but could not actively so-
licit such bids and could not provide competing bidders with proprietary information. Id.
The court found, however, that the provision allowing the receipt of competing bids was
not proven to be a term of the agreement, because defendants were guilty of an "unex-
plained failure to produce and identify the original merger agreement." Id. For authority,
the court cited the "well established principle," similar to the best evidence rule, "that
the production of weak evidence when strong is, or should have been, available can lead
only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 868.
76. Id. The court noted that if given, this advice was "of no consequence." Id. at 881.
The court explained that: (1) directors are often subjected to legal action, but will be pro-
tected from judicial scrutiny when acting "within the ambit of the business judgment
rule" and that the fear of a lawsuit is no justification for "permitting itself to be stam-
peded into a patently unadvised act;" and (2) the advice that a fairness opinion is not re-
quired is only meaningful if the directors possessed other adequate valuation informa-
tion. Id.
77. Id. at 868-69.
78. Id at 869.
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Gorkom executed the agreement which had not been read by ei-
ther himself or any Trans Union director.
7 9
While the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the Trans
Union Board "had given sufficient time and attention to the
[merger] transaction,"8° the Delaware Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that the Board had not acted on an informed basis
and therefore, the decision was not protected by the business
judgment rule.81 The Delaware Supreme Court's analysis mea-
sured the Board's conduct against three standards: the fiduciary
duty of care,8 2 the standard of gross negligence 83 and the statu-
tory duties that govern a board's adoption of a proposed
merger.84 The court's finding that the Board acted on an unin-
formed basis refers both to the September 20 meetinges and sub-
sequent Board actions.
86
The September 20 decision failed to satisfy the informed
business judgment standard because the Board was inade-
quately informed about (1) Van Gorkom's role in procuring the
merger and suggesting the price, and (2) the intrinsic value of
Trans Union shares.87 The court focused on the lack of prior no-
tice as to the meeting's subject matter and the extent to which
the Board's decision was based solely on Van Gorkom represen-
tations, without review of the agreement or any written sum-
mary of its termsca The court stressed that while Delaware law
fully protects a director's good faith reliance on officer-generated
79. Id
80. Id. at 870.
81. Id. at 893.
82. Id at 872.
83. Id. at 873.
84. Id. The court refers to section 251(b) of the Delaware Code as the source for the
duty "to act in an informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve
an agreement of merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders." Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1983)). The statute
provides:
The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consoli-
date shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolida-
tion. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the merger or
consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect... (5) the manner
of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or
other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or
consolidation... and (6) such other details or provisions as are deemed desira-
ble ....
DEL CODE: ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1983).
85. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878.
86. Id- at 888. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
87. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
88. Id
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reports, 9 no such report was presented to the Trans Union di-
rectors.90 Any statutory reliance is conditioned on the require-
ment that the opinion relied upon "was reached on a sound ba-
sis."91 The issue, as stated by the court, was whether the
directors had accessed and analyzed "all information that was
reasonably available to them. Had they done so, they would
have learned of the source and derivation of the $55 price and
could not reasonably have relied thereupon in good faith."92 De-
fendants offered several arguments for application of the busi-
ness judgment rule to their actions at the September 20 meet-
ing, but each was rejected by the court.93
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983). This section provides:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated
by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully pro-
tected in relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon
such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation
by any of the corporation's officers or employees, or committees of the board of
directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes
are within such other person's professional or expert competence and who has
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
Id.
90. Van Gorkom, 488 A-2d at 874-75 ("At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status
conferred by § 141(e), it must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which a board is
called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance.") (emphasis
added).
91. Id. at 877.
92. Id-
93. The following summary of defendants' arguments is taken in part from Barry F.
Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither Wew' Law nor 'Bad' Law, 10 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 429, 436 (1985) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wiles]: (1) Reliance on the market
price was based on a faulty premise. Id. The court extensively analyzed the role that the
"historically depressed" market played in the Board's acceptance of the $55 per share
price. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-78. In particular, the court was distressed by the
Board's apparent contradiction in repeatedly referring to the market's undervaluing of
Trans Union stock while at the same time relying on that market figure to assess the
sufficiency of the $55 offer. Id. at 876. Additionally, the Board "accepted without scru-
tiny" the $55 per share price and failed to discover the crucial fact that the price had
been "based on calculations designed solely to determine the feasibility of a leveraged
buy-out Id. at 877; (2) "'e so-called ninety day market test to determine the fairness
of the price was largely illusory." Schwartz & Wiles, supra at 436. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text; (3) The Board's "collective experience," standing alone, could not
render the September 20 decision informed and reasonable. Schwartz & Wiles, supra at
436; (4) Any legal advice regarding the optional nature of a fairness opinion was irrele-
vant to the question of the adequacy of the valuation information that the directors ac-
tually possessed. Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; (5) Equally irrelevant
was "counsel's advice that the Board would be subject to stockholder lawsuits if it re-
jected the $55 per share price" because such advice "could not constitute ... [a] valid ba-
sis on which to pursue an uninformed course." Schwartz & Wiles, supra at 436. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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With regard to the Board's actions subsequent to September
20, the court again found the conduct grossly negligent, unin-
formed, and therefore not curative of the deficient September 20
decision.94 On October 8, the Board met to amend the merger
agreement so as to permit a market test.95 Van Gorkom appar-
ently believed that the amendments permitted Trans Union to
openly solicit competitive bids and he represented this term to
his fellow directors.96 On that basis alone, the Board authorized
Van Gorkom to execute the yet undrafted amending documents
when he obtained them.97 In reality, however, Trans Union's
rights were restricted by the amendments. The company could
now solicit offers, but in order for Trans Union to withdraw
from the merger agreement, a competing offer had to be supe-
rior to Pritzker's and finalized by February 10, 1981, subject
only to shareholder approval.98 In addition, contrary to Van
Gorkom's belief, "the market test period was effectively re-
duced," rather than extended, because Trans Union was re-
quired to file its preliminary proxy statement by December 5,
fifteen days shorter than the alleged market test period under
the original merger agreement. 99 The court was also critical of
Van Gorkom's response to the KKR proposal-a leveraged buy-
out proposed by senior management members minus Van
Gorkom. 100 He was "completely negative," refused to allow a
press release announcing the offer'01 and denied any responsibil-
ity for the offer's withdrawal, though he had conversed hours
earlier with a member of the senior management purchasing
94. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888.
95. This meeting was in response to the uproar by senior management following the
September 22 press release announcing a "definitive [merger] agreement[ ]." Id. at 881-
82.
96. Id at 882.
97. Id. at 883. Again Van Gorkom signed the documents "without reviewing [them].
•. to determine if they were consistent with the authority previously granted him by the
Board I&
98. Id.
99. Id. The original merger agreement called for a 90 day period from September 20
to December 20. Id. at 868. The original agreement's market test period is "alleged" be-
cause the agreement was never offered into evidence. See supra note 74.
100. KKR is more formally known as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., the Wall
Street investment firm that made millions from leveraged buyouts in the 1980s. For a
fascinating account of KKR's rise and fall, see GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT
(1992).
101. Van Gorkom stated his concern that such a release would "chill" other possible
offers, but the court noted that this concern contradicted Van Gorkom's advocacy of the
press release of Pritzker, which he believed would encourage other offers. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 884-85 & n.27.
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group. 02 Finally, the court concluded that the Board's January
26 meeting had no curative effect because "the Board was mis-
taken as a matter of law regarding its available courses of ac-
tion."10 3 Consequently, the court held that the Trans Union di-
rectors "breached their fiduciary duty to their stockholders ...
by their failure to inform themselves of all information reasona-
bly available to them and relevant to their decision to recom-
mend the Pritzker merger.
10 4
On October 11, 1985, the Court of Chancery accepted the
$23.5 million damage settlement, 05 but, while the litigation had
ended, the impact of the decision was only beginning to surface.
Most of the commentary from practitioners -and scholars was
highly negative.106 Some of the harshest and most sardonic criti-
cism came from Justice McNeilly's dissent. 0 7 Likening the ma-
jority decision to "an advocate's closing address to a hostile
jury"'08 and labeling it a "comedy of errors,"10 9 McNeilly criti-
cized the majority's factual findings with respect to the Trans
Union Board's knowledge and ability. 0 He referred to the ma-
jority's analysis as an "exploitation of the negative . . . [that
fails to] giv[e] credit to the positive.""' McNeilly began his dis-
sent by broadening the time frame of review to include an em-
102. Id. at 885.
103. Id at 888. The minutes of the meeting reveal that the Board considered (1)
continued recommendation of the agreement, (2) a recommendation that the sharehold-
ers vote against the agreement, (3) and a noncommittal position. Id. at 887-88. The
court concluded that option two would violate the merger agreement. Id. Additionally,
the court found choice three to be inconsistent with the pertinent Delaware statute since
the statute requires that corporate directors who "desire[ I to merge or consolidate shall
adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation." Id. (emphasis
added) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974), amended by 70 Del. Laws 349
(1996)). Thus, the Trans Union Board could not remain uncommitted under § 251. See
supra note 84 for text of this provision.
104. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. The court also held that the directors breached
their duty of disclosure to the shareholders. Id.
105. Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 6342, 1985 WL 22040, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1985) (on re-
mand from the Delaware Supreme Court).
106. See Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 93, at 429 ("The condemnation appears to be
virtually unanimous."). But see id. at 430-31 ("We... take issue with Professor Fischel's
claim that the decision in Trans Union constitutes 'bad law' and, in particular, that the
rule announced is contrary to the interests of stockholders.").
107. Justice Christie also offered a brief dissent, stating his belief that the actions
of the Trans Union Board were protected by the business judgment rule. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 898 (Christie, J., dissenting).
108. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 894.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 897.
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phasis on the educational and professional backgrounds of each
of the directors, noting that "[d]irectors of this caliber are not
ordinarily taken in by a 'fast shuffle.' "s Next, McNeilly extolled
the Board's familiarity with the company itself,"3 and only after
laying that foundation did he address the specifics of the
Pritzker merger. McNeilly stressed the significance of the
Board's "discussion" and their insistence on two modifications of
the agreement."4 This reference is peculiar, since the majority
repeatedly stated that the original September 20 merger agree-
ment was never offered into evidence."15 The impact of any
Board demands is weakened by the fact, not mentioned by the
dissent, that the Board failed to take any precaution to ensure
that their intent was carried out; that is, they never requested
or viewed any written documentation of the terms.
The commentary spurred by Smith v. Van Gorkom can be
divided into two basic categories: those that condemn the deci-
sion and forecast the grave consequences of a clearly erroneous
decision, and those that characterize the decision as a firm reit-
eration of existing Delaware precedent. The commentary ranges
from immediate, impassioned reactions from corporate practi-
tioners and involved parties, to reasoned, thorough analysis
from scholars."6 A review of the negative commentary is signifi-
112. Id. at 894.
113. Id. at 895.
114. Id. Any interested bidder was to be given access to Trans Union information on
the same footing as Pritzker. Id. In addition, the directors would be free to accept and
recommend to the shareholders any offer that was better than the Pritzker offer. Id.
115. See id. at 868 n.7, 878.
The Merger Agreement, specifically identified as that originally presented to
the Board on September 20, has never been produced by the defendants, not-
withstanding the plaintiffs' several demands for production before as well as
during trial. No acceptable explanation of this failure has been given either to
the Trial Court or this Court .... Thus, the Court is deprived of the best evi-
dence on which to judge the merits of the defendants' position as to the care
and attention which they gave to the terms of the Agreement on September 20.
Id. at 878. In addition, the majority stated that the Board meeting minutes did not sup-
port the Board's contention that the right to accept better offers had been reserved. Id.
at 869. "No reference to either of the so-called 'conditions' or of Trans Union's reserved
right to test the market appears in any notes of the Board meeting or in the Board Res-
olution accepting the Pritzker offer or in the Minutes of the meeting itself:" Id. at 879.
116. The Chicago Tribune captured some first-hand reactions from the parties
themselves. Mary Holm Ansley, Trans Union Shareholders Win Round One, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 1, 1985, § 3, at 2. The following are the most notable reactions. Id. Days after the
Delaware Supreme Court decision, Jerome Van Gorkom had few words: "I really don't
have anything to say at this point, except that I know the decision is totally at variance
with the law and the facts." Id. Jay Pritzker was a bit more critical following finalization
of the settlement: "'It's a terrible decision; it was ridiculous . . . . The upper court
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cant because it tracks the controversy that has attached itself to
the decision. This controversy may have been a reason behind
the Delaware Supreme Court's unwillingness to measure the
Board's action in Paramount v. QVC 117 against the stringent Van
Gorkom standard.
118
Because the Van Gorkom gross negligence holding rested
predominantly on the court's finding of deficient procedure prior
to a business decision, much of the criticism attacks the court as
ignorant to the ways of the business world." 9 The court was ob-
viously concerned with the hastiness and informality of the deci-
sion to accept Pritzker's merger. Some argue that this concern
was unwarranted. Chicago attorneys Leo Herzel and Leo Katz
assert that caution can be a "costly vice" in the boardroom be-
cause it limits a director's ability to take bold moves12o Herzel
and Katz argue that a publicly held corporation is a particularly
objectionable atmosphere for excess caution because sharehold-
ers with "diversified portfolio[s] would do best if every corpora-
tion they invest in would maximize its expected gain instead ofminimizing its risks."12 In essence, Herzel and Katz profess that
"[a] company need not protect shareholders from risk" because
the shareholders can easily do this themselves by diversifying
their holdings.
2
The majority's focus on the procedures, or lack thereof, in-
volved in a single transaction has been criticized as unreasona-
missed the whole dynamics of the case." Bill Barnhart & Sally Saville Hodge, Pritzker
Less than Charitable to the Court, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1985, § 4, at 1 [hereinafter Barn-
hart & Hodge]. Two years after the momentous ruling, Van Gorkom spoke about the dif-
ficulty in dealing with injustices in the world: "'Now, because of [the decision], people
who don't know me think of me as the guy who sold his company in two hours." See
Elsner, supra note 66, at 1. "The worst thing about this is the case is always referred to
as Smith v. Van Gorkom .... I really wish they would call it something else." Id. at 9.
117. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
118. See infra Part VI.
119. Leo Herzel et al., 'Smith' Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs, LEGAL TMs,
May 13, 1985, at 14 ("The court's review of the chancery court's findings of fact demon-
strates the arrogance of appellate courts at their worst.... [T]he court's observations
about the way in which the business world works are frequently wildly wrong) [herein-
after Herzel].
120. Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Busi-
ness Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187, 1189 (1986) (explaining that marketing researchers
refer to excess caution in business as "the fallacy of conservatism,'" and that this phe-
nomenon has caused a host of U.S. companies to lose out to competitors) [hereinafter
Herzel & Katz].
121. Id. at 1190.
122. Id. This view seems to ignore the difference between risk and unnecessary
risk. Even the shareholder without diverse holdings who has invested in one corporation
should be entitled to maximize gain without being subjected to unnecessary risk.
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bly narrow.2 3 The assessment that results from such a restricted
view, it is argued, is inferior to the market's ability to measure
a director's caliber based on a career of business decisions.
Herzel and Katz criticize the court system as an inadequate
means for evaluating the conduct of directors, because of a
court's very inability to review more than one piece at a time.
2 4
The market is a more effective instrument for such measure-
ments, they contend, because the market monitors a corporate
director's conduct over time, during which "good luck and bad
luck cancel out."125 Perhaps what the court is asserting, how-
ever, is that the market test is not stringent enough because it
punishes the incompetent director by leaving him unemployed,
but fails to reimburse the shareholder who suffers from such
incompetence.
While the court disapproved of Van Gorkom's role in sug-
gesting a workable price rather than the best price and his fail-
ure to reveal this role to the directors, some critics of the deci-
sion have commended Van Gorkom's conduct. Illinois attorney
and University of Chicago law professor Daniel R. Fischel main-
tains that the Van Gorkom facts as found by the Delaware Su-
preme Court may be interpreted in a very different, and much
more plausible, way.26 Focusing on Van Gorkom's conduct, Fis-
chel inquires, "why does this cofhduct not instead demonstrate
Van Gorkom's skill as a negotiator in putting together a deal
and convincing the other party that the deal made sense from
his perspective as well?" 2 7 Others characterize Van Gorkom's ac-
tions as "common technique for clever sellers because it immedi-
ately gets the buyer on the seller's side."2s It is important, how-
ever,.to recognize the distinction between the foci of the court
and the critics. On the one hand, commentators emphasize the
123. Like such critics, Justice McNeilly's dissent preferred a broadened view that
considered the background and general knowledge of the directors. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 856, 894-95 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J., dissenting) and supra notes 109,
110 and accompanying text.
124. Herzel & Katz, supra note 120, at 1189 (contending that courts have great dif-
ficulty determining "whether the litigated misfortune is due to bad luck or bad decision
making"). On the topic of distinguishing performance of fiduciary duty from breach, see
Fischel, supra note 40 at 1440-41.
125. Herzel & Katz, supra note 120, at 1189 (comparing a judge's "single swing of
the bat" to the market's view of "the batting average[s]").
126. Fischel, supra note 40, at 1446.
127. Id. Additionally, one commentary notes that the majority opinion ignores the
fact that Trans Union's $700 million price tag limited the number of available buyers,
thus making Van Gorkom's solicitation of Pritzker necessary. Herzel, supra note 119, at
14.
128. Herzel, supra note 119, at 14.
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validity of Van Gorkom's reasons for approaching Pritzker as
well as his marketing prowess. The court, on the other hand,
seems most disturbed by (1) Van Gorkom's failure to reveal to
the Trans Union Board the exact nature of his participation and
(2) the fact that the price suggested to Pritzker was a figure
most workable for a buyer wishing to avoid long-term debt with-
out documented consideration of the best price for the
shareholders.
In addition to criticizing the merits of the Van Gorkom deci-
sion, much of the negative commentary warned of its grave con-
sequences129 Most fears were calmed, however, when the Dela-
ware legislature amended an existing statute to allow
corporations to adopt provisions that limit or eliminate director
liability for duty of care violations.130 The amendment "essen-
129. One such commentary was by Leo Herzel and Leo Katz:
[C]ourts will have to decide in every case whether the matter in issue is the
"product" of a board decision and hence entitled to a lot of respect, or an aspect
of its decision-making procedure entitled to no respect. And who's to know how
the court will draw that distinction in a given case? The result: randomness
and unpredictability galore. Randomness, in turn, brings with it more
litigation.
Herzel & Katz, supra note 120, at 1191; see also Fischel, supra note 40, at 1454 (main-
taining that directors will not be as willing to sit on corporate boards and that when
they do so, will be more risk averse); Barnhart & Hodge, supra note 116, at 8 ("Pritzker
agrees with those who say the ruling will have a chilling effect on corporate directors
everywhere."); Elsner, supra note 66, at 9 (quoting a Chicago venture capitalist who
complained: "Now we need 'expert opinions' and long, formal meetings with attorneys
present to decide on things we used to be able to do over the telephone."). In addition;
many fears focused on the inevitability of increased director and officer ("D&O") insur-
ance rates. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Lynn A. Howell, Post
Smith v. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation with a Proactive Perspective, 36 CLay.
ST. L. REv. 559, 566-68 (1988) ("Following Van Gorkom, D & 0 policies almost became
extinct.").
130. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1986). This subsection permits the articles of
incorporation to include:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director. (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under
§ 174 of this title [relating to unlawful distributions]; or (iv) for any transac-
tion from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such
provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omis-
sion occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective.
Id. This type of legislative enactment permits the shareholder to predetermine the limits
of director liability. "If shareholders want protection from gross negligence... they can
reject proposals to limit director liability. If they prefer to give directors the discretion to
take business risks without having to fear monetary loss for negligence, they can ap-
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tially allows a corporation to fill in the gap in the business judg-
ment rule left open by Van Gorkom."
131
Though filling in a gap, the statute also creates some of its
own. Equitable relief survives in the statute for breaches of both
loyalty and care.132 Further, while due care breaches may be ex-
empted from liability, the statute provides for six particular in-
stances in which liability may not be limited, most notably,
breaches of duty of loyalty.133 Thus, when faced with a breach of
fiduciary duty case, the award of money damages will depend
solely on the court's determination as to which duty is in-
volved. 34 The exception for breach of loyalty has been noted for
its problematic nature.135 One reason for the confusion is that
the phrase "duty of loyalty" is not defined by any Delaware stat-
ute. 36 As such, the duty can be maneuvered to include or ex-
clude the situation at hand. The ease of manipulation would
have been of utmost importance in Revlon if the suit had been
brought by a dissatisfied shareholder following shareholder ap-
proval of the liability limiting provision. The court could not
have been so imprecise in naming the particular duty involved if
monetary damages had been at stake.
prove such proposals." Linsley, supra note 43, at 533 (footnotes omitted).
131. See Linsley, supra note 43, at 527-28.
132. § 102(b)(7). Equitable remedies include either an injunction or rescission.
Hanks, supra note 22, at 1215.
In fact, if money damages are not available, a court may be more likely to
grant equitable relief Thus, for example, a suit to enjoin directors from voting
in favor of a merger would not be dismissed if the directors were preparing to
act in violation of their duty of care.
Id.
133. § 102(b)(7)(i).
134. Douglas S. Wilson, Director and Officer Liability: State Legislative Reaction to
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 22 CREIGHTON L. REv. 747, 755 (1989) [hereinafter Wilson]. This
issue is even more significant in light of the recognition:
that courts have occasionally invoked the duty of care when in fact their main
concern has been potential disloyalty.... [W]here the court senses underlying
loyalty problems but the plaintiff is unable to prove them, the court can allow
the case to proceed on duty of care grounds, thereby avoiding the evidentiary
difficulties involved in a duty of loyalty approach.
Linsley, supra note 43, at 552.
135. See, eg., Hanks, supra note 22, at 1212; Linsley, supra note 43, at 535; Wilson,
supra note 134, at 755.
136. Hanks, supra note 22, at 1212 ("The fact that one of the other exceptions ... is
for 'improper personal benefit' suggests that breach of the duty of loyalty means some-
thing more than just self-dealing.").
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IV. THE DUTY TO MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER PROFIT:
REVLON V MACANDREWS & FORBES HOLDINGS
While Van Gorkom's duty to become informed can clearly be
characterized as a duty of care, the duty to maximize share-
holder profits can arguably be classified as either a duty of care
or a duty of loyalty. 37 Even the Delaware courts have had diffi-
culty in this regard138 and have been criticized for their inconsis-
tency. 39 Regardless of the terminology used to describe the obli-
gation, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.14°
added to Delaware law the concept that when a company is for
sale, that company's board of directors must act as auctioneers
to insure that shareholders receive the best possible price for
their shares.41
The Revlon suit challenged certain actions taken by the
Revlon Board to aid its friendly bidder, Forstmann Little & Co.
("Forstmann"), and thwart the unwelcome overtures of Pantry
Pride, Inc.142 Unlike Smith v. Van Gorkom, where a target
shareholder sought damages, the Revlon plaintiff was a hostile
bidder requesting injunctive relief.143 While Pantry Pride's status
137. See Linsley, supra note 43, at 549.
138. Specifically, the Delaware Chancery Court ruled that the Revlon Board had vi-
olated its duty of loyalty by placing other interests-their own and those of the notehold-
ers-above the interests of the shareholders. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. v. Rev-
lon Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court, on the
other hand, held that the duty breached was the duty of care. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184-85 (Del. 1986). See infra notes 177-88
and accompanying text.
139. Linsley, supra note 43, at 549-50.
140. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
141. For a unique discussion of the identity of shareholders in a takeover context,
see Jon K. Grant, Mergers and Acquisitions: Leveling the Playing Field, Bus. Q., Spring
1996, at 17, 19 ("Unfortunately, by the time the best price is obtained, the shareholders
are a transient collection of arbitrageurs who are gambling on the company's shares.").
142. 'The nominal plaintiff, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., is the controlling
stockholder of Pantry Pride." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175 n.1. Pantry Pride is hereinafter
treated as the plaintiff Pantry Pride, based in Fort Lauderdale, operates supermarkets,
drug stores and furniture and appliance outlets. Beauty-Products Firm Plans to Pay Pre-
mium for 10 Million of Own Shares: Revlon Rejects Pantry Pride's Takeover Offer, L. A.
Tams, Aug. 27, 1985, Part IV, at 1 [hereinafter Beauty-Products].
The general fact pattern involved in most "takeover litigation" is that a 'hostile' or
unsolicited bid has been made for the company. The bid has an immediate market value
potentially exceeding the immediate value of an alternative transaction or course of ac-
tion preferred by the board of directors, but the bid cannot be accepted by the sharehold-
ers because of board action or inaction. David C. McBride, Paramount and QVC - An
Encore for Mergers and Acquisitions, 866 PLI CORP. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SE-
ims, No. B4-7068, 839, 843 (1994) [hereinafter McBride].
143. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175.
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as a hostile bidder is crucial to the events that followed, the re-
lationship between Revlon and Pantry Pride was not necessarily
hostile at the outset. As soon as Pantry Pride revealed its bid,
however, the hostility was apparent.
In June of 1985, Ronald 0. Perelman, Chairman of the
Board and CEO of Pantry Pride'4 approached Revlon Board
Chairman and CEO Michel C. Bergerac to discuss the prospect
of a friendly acquisition of Revlon by Pantry Pride.145 Bergerac
rejected as inadequate Pantry Pride's suggested $40 to $50 per
share price and "rebuffed" all subsequent Pantry Pride proposals
and bids."'6 In August, Perelman again approached Bergerac to
consider alternative buyout methods, but Bergerac was unre-
sponsive and in fact required that Perelman sign a standstill
agreement as a precondition to any further talks.
47
In response to the possibility of a hostile bid by Pantry
Pride, the Revlon Board adopted defensive measures designed to
prevent the success of any insufficient unwelcome bid.'4 When
144. Perelman was also Pantry Pride's controlling shareholder. Paul Richter, Pantry
Pride Expects to Sell Health-Care Units of Revlon If Bid Wins, L. A. TiMs, Aug. 24,
1985, Part IV, at 1.
145. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. However, the objective friendliness of Panty Pride's
intentions is debatable. The $42-$43 price originally offered was deemed grossly inade-
quate by Revlon's investment banker, id. at 176-77, and was much lower than Pantry
Pride's hostile bid of $58 per share only four months later on October 22. Id. at 179.
146. Id. at 176. The court suggested that Bergerac's discourteous treatment of Pan-
try Pride might have been due in part to Bergerac's personal aversion for Perelman. Id.
147. Id. -The standstill agreement [would] havq prohibit[ed] [Pantry Pride] from ac-
quiring Revlon without the latter's prior approval" Id.
148. Id. at 177. At the August 19 meeting, the Revlon Board followed the advice of
Martin Lipton, special counsel, and adopted (1) a "Notes" plan for Revlon to repurchase
up to roughly seventeen percent of its outstanding shares with newly issued notes and
(2) a "Rights" plan, under which each Revlon shareholder could exchange one common
share for a one-year Revlon note with a face value of $65 and bearing twelve percent in-
terest. Id. at 176-77. 'The Rights would become effective whenever anyone acquired ben-
eficial ownership of 20% or more of Revlon's shares, unless the purchaser acquired all
the company stock for cash at $65 or more per share." Id. at 177. In addition, before the
rights became effective, they could be abrogated by the Board for ten cents each. Id. The
rights plan was Revlon's "Poison-Pill," that acted as a kill-switch in the event of an inad-
equate hostile bid. Poison pills
are special issues of preferred stock or debt securities issued by potential tar-
get companies with rights that are designed specifically to make unwanted
takeover attempts difficult, impractical, or impossible.... The unique charac-
teristic of a poison pill is that additional rights are granted to shareholders
when an aggressor makes a public tender offer for target shares or acquires a
specified percentage of the targets shares.
HAmILTON, supra note 5, at § 17.13. The court defined poison pill as "a plan by which
shareholders receive the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial pre-
mium on the occurrence of a stated triggering event." Revlon, 506 A2d at 180 (citing
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Pantry Pride made its first hostile bid,149 the Board began its re-
purchase plan, exchanging newly issued notes' 50 for the ten-
dered shares and thus made any hostile takeover a difficult
task.151 On September 24, the Revlon Board gave management
the authorization to negotiate a sale with other interested par-
ties, but a determined Pantry Pride continued to increase its
bid. 152 On October 3, following negotiations with Forstmann, the
Revlon board of directors voted unanimously in support of a
leveraged buyout by Forstmann.153 The public announcement of
the merger and its terms had an adverse impact on the notes,
causing them to trade at a value much lower than when
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). Revlon's investment banker
condemned the Pantry Pride offer because "Pantry Pride's financial strategy for acquir-
ing Revlon would be through junk bond' financing followed by a break-up of Revlon and
the disposition of its assets." Id. at 177. These very features were an integral part of the
Forstmann deal. The merger agreement with Forstmann called for a pre-merger sale of
two divisions to an investment group as well as Forstmann's post-merger sale of two
more divisions. Id. at 178. In addition, Forstmann announced that it planned to finance
the purchase of Revlon with "a sizable chunk of borrowed funds." Dean Rotbart, Some
Revlon Investors Say Company's Moves Could Cost Them Millions of Dollars in Losses,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1985, § 2, at 63 [hereinafter Rotbart].
149. Pantry Pride offered $47.50 cash for each common share and $26.67 per pre-
ferred share, subject to financing and the Revlon Board's redemption of the rights plan.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. On August 22, Pantry Pride filed suit against Revlon seeking to
enjoin the Board's implementation of the rights plan. Id. at 179. The complaint alleged
that the poison pill "'alter[ed] the terms of the Revlon common stock without the ap-
proval of stockholders' in violation of Delaware law." Beauty-Products, supra note 142,
Part IV, at 11. Later Pantry Pride amended its complaint to challenge the lock-up, can-
cellation fee and notes covenants. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
150. 506 A.2d at 179. Commenting on Revlon's stock repurchase plan, Revlon CEO
Bergerac used strong words to describe the Panty Pride bid: "' [o ]ur board believes that
the Revlon exchange offer provides our shareholders a far better alternative to the
highly conditional and totally inadequate offer by Pantry Pride... ." Beauty-Products,
supra note 139, Part IV, at 1.
151. The notes contained restrictive covenants "which limited Revlon's ability to in-
cur additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless otherwise approved by the 'inde-
pendent' (non-management) members of the board." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. Revlon's
defensive measures did cool Pantry Pride's interest slightly. Pantry Pride decreased its
bid to $42, and conditioned it upon the tender of at least ninety percent of the outstand-
ing shares. Id.
152. Id. On September 27, Pantry Pride's bid rose to $50, $53 on October 1 and
$56.25 on October 7. Id.
153. Id. at 178. The basic terms involved at the $56 cash per share price were that
management was to receive stock in the new company, as a bonus or "golden parachute,"
and the Revlon Board agreed to redeem the rights and waive the notes covenants. Id.
"Golden parachutes are lucrative severance contracts for top management whose employ-
ment with the corporation may be terminated upon successful takeover." HAMILTON,
supra note 5, at § 17.12.1.
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issued.
154
Pantry Pride's increased bid of $56.25115 was matched by a
Forstmann offer of $57.25, but this Forstmann bid was subject
to several new conditions. 156 As consideration for these condi-
tions, Forstmann agreed to issue new notes in exchange for
those previously issued by Revlon that had suffered a decrease
in value. 157 The Revlon Board again voted unanimously in ap-
proval of the Forstmann proposal "because: (1) it was for a
higher price than the Pantry Pride bid, (2) it protected the Note-
holders, and (3) Forstmann's financing was firmly in place."' 8
Days later, Pantry Pride again raised its bid to $58 conditioned
154. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. In a Wall Street Journal article mentioned by the
court, id., noteholders expressed their shock and dismay about the Forstmann merger
and the extent to which Forstmann planned to increase the company's debt. See Rotbart,
supra note 148, at 63. Investors characterized the situation as a bait and switch and
were surprised by the announcement "because of Revlon's previous vow not to sell to a
'bust-up artist' and because materials for Revlon's exchange offer.., gave no indication
that such a transaction might occur." Id. The decreased value of the notes "reflects the
market's fear that if either Pantry Pride's or Forstmann Little's latest offers succeed,
Revlon's balance sheet will be further burdened with debt, effectively lowering the qual-
ity of the company's existing debt issues." Id. Some larger investors considered legal ac-
tion against Revlon based on full disclosure issues, since "'[di e a ls just don't get put to-
gether from start to finish in seven days, even if your work 24 hours a day.. . '" Id.
155. This Pantry Pride offer was conditioned on redemption of the rights and waiver
of the notes, as was Forstmann's offer. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. In addition, Pantry
Pride sought to have three of its own directors elected to the Revlon Board. Id.
156. Id. In particular, Forstmann required that Revlon management no longer par-
ticipate in the merger and demanded: (1) a lock-up option to purchase two key Revlon
divisions should another acquirer prove successful; (2) a no-shop provision; and (3) a $25
million cancellation fee. Id. at 178. A no shop provision is an agreement between the
target company and a friendly bidder that requires the target to refrain from solicita-
tion, negotiations or otherwise entering into competing merger agreements. See Judi G.
Sorensen, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.: Do Suitors of a Target
Corporation Have a "Right to Compete?,' 25 IDAHo L. REy. 441, 451 (1988/1989). These
provisions are usually worded so as to allow the board members to adhere to the agree-
ment, yet fulfill their fiduciary duties. Id. The cancellation fee was to be placed in es-
crow and paid to Forstmann if the agreement fell through or if another bidder acquired
more than 19.9% of Revlon shares. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
157. Id. at 178-79. The effect of the exchange was that Forstmann was supporting
the par value of the Revlon notes. Id.
158. Id. at 179. The court noted, however, that at the time the Revlon Board ap-
proved the Forstmann bid, "about $400 million of Forstmann's funding" was not yet se-
cured. Id. Pantry Pride's financing was similarly conditional, "although Pantry Pride rep-
resented in an October 11 letter to [Revlon's investment banker] that [Pantry Pride's]
investment banker... was highly confident of its ability to raise the balance of $350
million." Id- at 179 n.7. Only days later, Pantry Pride's investment banker "had a firm
commitment for this sum.... " Id Pantry Pride amended its August 22 complaint seek-
ing to enjoin the lock-up, cancellation fee and notes covenants, in addition to the rights
plan. Id. at 179.
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on the nullification of the above terms.159
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery's grant
of injunctive relief, holding that the Revlon directors failed to
maximize shareholder profits by ending an active auction on an
insubstantial basis.160 The court upheld the Board's initial adop-
tion of the rights plan, under Unoca 161 analysis, but found that
it was rendered ineffective by the Board's subsequent actions.
62
While the court also upheld the Revlon Board's adoption of the
repurchase and notes plan, 63 it ruled that all inquires regarding
defensive measures became moot when the Board authorized
management to negotiate with third parties.'6 The granting of
this authorization was, the court held, "a recognition that the
company was for sale" 65 and such recognition altered the
Board's duty "from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate en-
tity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit." 66
The lock-up option granted to Forstmann was the Delaware
Supreme Court's crucial point of contention. Because this option
was granted after the decision to sell had been made, the only
permissible purpose for ending the active bidding was max-
imization of shareholder profits; protection of the noteholders
was not a proper objective.167 The emphasis of the option agree-
ment was "on shoring up the sagging market value of the notes
in the face of threatened litigation by [its] holders." 6 By acting
159. Id.
160. Id. at 185.
161. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra note
55 and accompanying text for a description of Unocal's objective standard regarding the
reasonableness of a defensive measure.
162. The court noted that on October 3, the Board redeemed the rights plan as a
term of the Forstmann merger and on October 12, passed a resolution that called for re-
demption of the rights for any cash offer of $57.25 or more. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
Since both bidders eventually surpassed $57.25, the rights plan proved useless. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 182.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. As the court observed, the noteholders had contracts with Revlon and thus
had fixed rights. Id "While Revlon's exchange offering materials didn't foreshadow Rev-
lon's arrangement with Forstmann Little, the company didn't preclude it either." See
Rotbart, supra note 148, at 63. The contracts permitted waiver of the restrictive cove-
nants if the outside directors granted their approval and "the Notes were accepted by
the holders on that basis, including the risk of an adverse market effect stemming from
a waiver." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
168. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. Not only the noteholders benefitted from the protec-
tions in the option agreement. Id. at 184. The Revlon Board derived the principal bene-
fit, since they avoided any litigation suggesting their personal liability to the notehold-
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to protect themselves from litigation, the Board failed to "with-
stand the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal169 requires of director
conduct."170 The "omnipresent specter"171 was in fact more than
an apparition because, in this case, the Revlon directors
breached their duty of loyalty "when [they] entered into an auc-
tion-ending lock-up agreement with Forstmann on the basis of
impermissible considerations at the expense of the shareholders
"172
The Delaware Supreme Court's ruling with respect to the
no-shop provision required that a level playing field be estab-
lished when competing offers are relatively similar.173 "Market
forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's
shareholders the best price available for their equity."7 4 The
court thereby affirmed the Chancery's injunction of the no-shop
provision. 7 5 With Forstmann virtually paralyzed by the injunc-
tion, Pantry Pride swiftly began buying Revlon shares and an-
nounced that their $58 cash offer had resulted in the tender of
eighty-eight percent of Revlon's outstanding common shares. 176
While the bulk of the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in
Revlon was in fact based on the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the de-
cision makes awkward references to the duty of care. There are
no facts in Revlon, however, that warrant duty of care analysis.
There is no allegation that the Revlon directors failed to inform
themselves about the competing bids. The Revlon directors were
very much aware regarding what and with whom 177 they were
ers. Id.
169. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra notes
53-56 and accompanying text.
170. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
171. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See supra note 55.
172. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. "[T]he result of the lock-up was not to foster bidding,
but to destroy it." Id. at 183.
173. Id. at 184. The court stated that favoritism for a particular bidder would be
justified if the hostile offer actually threatened shareholders' interests. Id. Here, how-
ever, the bidders were engaged in fractional bidding and both bidders intended to sell di-
visions of Revlon. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The court also found that the Delaware Chancery Court had not abused its
discretion in enjoining the cancellation fee "because the fee was part of the overall plan
to thwart Pantry Pride's efforts." Id.
176. Pantry Pride's Plans for Revlon Still Undisclosed, L. A. TIES, Nov. 5, 1985,
Part IV, at 4. To show their willingness to cooperate with Pantry Pride, Revlon an-
nounced that Revlon directors and officers would tender their shares. Revlon Bows to
Suitor in Hostile Fight: Firm Prepares for Orderly Transition to Pantry Pride, L. A.
Tims, Nov. 2, 1985, Part IV, at 1.
177. Recall the Delaware Supreme Court's reference to the fact that Revlon's
Bergerac had a strong distaste for Perelman of Pantry Pride. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
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dealing. Rather than an uninformed decision, Revlon was a case
of an informed but impermissibly self-interested decision.
The Delaware Court of Chancery accurately analyzed the
Revlon Board's conduct by exclusively focusing on duty of loy-
alty, but this focus was blurred by the Delaware Supreme Court
decision. The Chancery Court held that:
By agreeing to a lock-up and no shop clause in exchange for protecting
the rights of the Noteholders, the Revlon Board failed in its fiduciary
duty to the shareholders. The board may have been informed, but its
performance did not conform to the other component of the business
judgment rule - the duty of loyalty.178
In affirming the Chancery's decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court held, quite to the contrary, that the duty breached was
the duty of care. Rather than explain its divergence from the
Chancery's holding, the Delaware Supreme Court grievously
misstated that holding in its opening paragraph: "The Court of
Chancery found that the Revlon directors had breached their
duty of care by entering into the foregoing transactions [with
Forstmann] and effectively ending an active auction for the com-
pany. 179 Apparently using the terms interchangeably, the Su-
preme Court opinion further states that "the trial court con-
cluded that the Revlon directors had breached their duty of
loyalty by making concessions to Forstmann."'80 In the last
pages of the decision, the court reverts to its duty of care lexi-
con, holding that:
[tihe principal object [of the Revlon board's granting the lockup option to
the friendly bidder], contrary to the board's duty of care, appears to have
been protection of the noteholders over the shareholders' interests....
No such defensive measure can be sustained when it represents a breach
of the directors' fundamental duty of care.18'
This oddity in the court's terminology might have been ex-
plained as a simple oversight by the court. While that may have
been the case when Revlon was handed down, the Delaware Su-
preme Court took advantage of subsequent opportunities to pro-
fess that the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder profit did in-
See supra note 146.
178. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. v. Revlon Inc., 501 A-2d 1239, 1250 (Del.
Ch.), affid, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985).
179. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175 (Del.
1986).
180. Id. at 179; see Linsley, supra note 43, at 549 n.99.
181. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85.
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deed involve the duty of care. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp.,182 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "a di-
rector's role as an auctioneer "involves duties of loyalty and
care."183 Elaborating on this combination of duties, the court
cited two traditional authorities: Guth v. Loftl8-the traditional
authority that condemned self-dealing--and Smith v. Van
Gorkom'85-the duty of informed process precedent. 8 6 The latter
reference, again, is unwarranted because Revlon involved a self-
ish auctioneer, not an uninformed one.
The duty to maximize profits is clearly a goal-oriented obli-
gation; when all is said and done, the deal must be formulated
so as to secure for the shareholder the highest possible per
share price. Despite the Supreme Court's "duty of care" termi-
nology in Revlon, this result-focused obligation was the crucial
obligation set forth in Revlon when a Delaware corporation is
for sale. The Revlon court may have wanted to specifically in-
clude the requirement of informed process in the auctioneer's
checklist of duties, but that is not what they did. Only a year
later, in Ivanhoe, did the Delaware Supreme Court characterize
the Revlon duty as one of process and result. This subsequent
characterization becomes highly significant in Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,187 because it allows the
court to focus on the duty of care without resting solely on the
182. 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. The Revlon court explained:
The former embodies not only an affirmative duty to protect the interests of
the corporation, but also an obligation to refrain from conduct which would in-
jure the corporation and its stockholders or deprive them of profit or advan-
tage. In short, directors must eschew any conflict between duty and self-
interest .... On the other hand, the duty of care requires a director, when
making a business decision, to proceed with a 'critical eye' by acting in an in-
formed and deliberate manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue
before the board.
Id. (citations omitted). Subsequently, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988), the court reiterated its dual-duty holding:
Following Revlon, there appeared to be a degree of "scholarly" debate about the
particular fiduciary duty that had been breached in that case, i.e. the duty of
care or the duty of loyalty. In Ivanhoe we made it abundantly clear that both
duties were involved in Revlon, and that both had been breached.
Id. at 1284 n.34 (citation omitted). While the content of the court's holding was made
"abundantly clear" in post-Revlon decisions, the underlying reasoning was not. See gener-
ally Linsley, supra note 43.
185. 5 A-2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
186. 488 A-2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
187. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
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controversial Van Gorkom decision. 188
V. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS V QVC
Beginning in the late 1980s, Paramount Communications,
Inc. 189 sought to expand its operations and increase its competi-
tive edge by merging with other entertainment and communica-
tions companies. 90 In 1993, serious negotiations between Para-
mount and Viacom, Inc.191 were aimed at consummating a
merger whereby Sumner M. Redstone, Viacom's Chairman and
CEO, would be "the controlling stockholder" of the resulting
company and his counterpart at Paramount, Martin S. Davis,
would be CEO.192 A potential third player, Barry Diller of QVC,
Inc.,93 was told by Davis that a QVC bid was unwelcome be-
cause "Paramount was not for sale."194 The Paramount Board re-
viewed information provided by its financial advisors and unani-
mously approved the Paramount-Viacom merger agreement. 95
188. By combining the duty of care and duty of loyalty in the director's obligation to
maximize shareholder profits, the Delaware Supreme Court also leaves open the ques-
tion as to the application of section 102(b)(7) to a director's failure to carry out his re-
sponsibilities as an auctioneer, since this provision allows corporations to limit or ex-
empt liability for breaches of the duty of care, but not for failure of the duty of loyalty.
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986). See generally Linsley, supra note 43.
189. Paramount is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York City.
Paramount, 637 A.2d at 37.
190. Id. at 38. Notably, Paramount attempted to merge with Time, Inc., but was un-
successful in its tender offer. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1990).
191. Headquartered in Massachusetts, Viacom is also a Delaware corporation. Para-
mount, 637 A.2d at 37.
192. Id.
193. QVC, as well, is a Delaware corporation and its chief offices are located in
West Chester, Pennsylvania. Id. Interestingly, until 1984, Diller served as CEO of Para-
mount Pictures Corporation, a subsidiary of Gulf & Western Inc., later renamed Para-
mount Communications, Inc. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635
A.2d 1245, 1273 n.4 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
The Delaware Supreme Court decision included a brief summary of the facts drawn
from the Chancery Court's findings as well as from the Supreme Court's own "indepen-
dent review of the record." 637 A.2d at 37. The detailed findings of the Chancery deci-
sion, while not expressly adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court, are cited herein for
additional insight. While the Supreme Court recounted only those facts deemed neces-
sary for its opinion, this author prefers the detailed factual findings of the Chancery
opinion, as they provide additional evidence of the Paramount Board's deficient process.
"[The Delaware Chancery court ... blasted the Paramount board of directors for not
even meeting with QVC, let alone analyzing its bid. Ralph C. Ferrara and Bridget M.
Bush, The Year in Review, 866 PLI CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, No. B4-
7068, 9, 95 (1994).
194. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 38.
195. Id. at 39. The terms included the following- a per share cash price plus a stock-
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Following execution of the agreement, Paramount and Viacom
publicly announced the proposed merger, informing all that "the
pending transaction was a virtual certainty."
196
Again, a personal call was made to Diller to convince him
not to bid for Paramount. 197 That appeal was unsuccessful, how-
ever, and Diller contacted Davis to advise him of QVC's merger
proposal and request a meeting. 98 At the Paramount Board's
next meeting, the QVC proposal was discussed, but Davis ad-
vised the Board that any discussion or negotiation with any bid-
der would violate the Viacom merger agreement, unless the bid
was proven to be free from financing contingencies. 199 When re-
quested by Paramount, QVC supplied Paramount with informa-
tion about its financing arrangements, but Paramount repeat-
edly delayed any negotiations with QVC.2°0 Frustrated by their
continued unsuccessful attempts at negotiation,2 1 QVC filed for
preliminary injunctive relief in Delaware Chancery Court202 and
publicly announced a tender offer.203 Viacom responded to the
for-stock exchange; an amendment to Paramount's rights agreement (their "Poison Pill")
such that the Viacom merger would not constitute a triggering event; a no-shop provi-
sion; a $100 million termination fee; and a stock option agreement. Id. See supra note
148 for explanations of the terms poison pill, no-shop provision and termination (or can-
cellation) fee. The stock option agreement, deemed by the court as the "most significant
deterrent device," permitted Viacom to purchase twenty percent of Paramount's out-
standing shares upon certain triggering events. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 39. The terms
allowed Viacom to purchase the shares with "a senior subordinated note of questionable
marketability" rather than cash and granted Viacom the right to require that Para-
mount pay Viacom a cash amount "equal to the difference between the purchase price
and the market price of Paramount's stock." Id. The court found these two provisions
"both unusual and highly beneficial to Viacom Id.
196. Id. "Redstone described it as a 'marriage' that would 'never be torn asunder'
and stated that only a 'nuclear attack' could break the deal." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 39-40. QVC maintains that Davis' proof requirement was a fabrication,
since the original merger agreement referred only to "an unsolicited written, bona fide
proposal, which is not subject to any material contingencies relating to financing." QVC,
635 A.2d at 1253 n.14 (citing Original Merger Agreement § 6.02).
200. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 40.
201. QVC waited five days for a response from Paramount on its initial proposal,
QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993), and a full week while Paramount signed a confidentiality
agreement. Id. at 1254. Additionally, after complying with a Paramount request for doc-
uments, QVC was told that they would be contacted by Paramount "when Paramount
was ready.' Id.
202. QVC sought both preliminary and permanent injunctions to set aside the de-
fensive measures adopted in the Paramount-Viacom merger agreement. Paramount, 637
A.2d at 36.
203. Id. at 40. "[A] corporation may be acquired by one of two means ... tender of-
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QVC bid by raising their bid and revising their agreement with
Paramount.20 4 When Paramount was ready to meet with QVC,
the latter proposed fair bidding guidelines to govern both
Viacom and QVC, but Paramount rejected them as inconsistent
with their merger agreement with Viacom. 20 5 A round of in-
creased bids followed, as did a Paramount Board meeting called
to discuss the "'conditions and uncertainties' of QVC's offer."206
At that meeting, the directors voted that the best interests of
the shareholders would not be served by the QVC proposal, al-
legedly because the offer was "excessively conditional."20 7 "[W]ith
this limited data regarding the conditions of QVC's offer, the
board simply followed management's lead in rejecting the un-
welcome offer."
208
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery
Court's grant of injunctive relief to QVC.209 In doing so, the Su-
preme Court focused on the fact that the Paramount Board's
fer or merger... A tender offer is addressed directly to the shareholders and is simply
an offer to purchase their shares." McBride, supra note 142, at 844.
204. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 40. The court noted that while Paramount brought
newly-acquired leverage to the bargaining table, the amended merger agreement and
original merger agreement were "essentially the same.' Id. The amended agreement al-
tered the cash and stock portions of the price, allowed the Paramount Board to renew
the applicability of the poison pill to the Viacom merger and to terminate or withdraw
its recommendation of the Viacom merger, if such were necessary to fulfill fiduciary du-
ties in the face of a " 'better alternative." Id.
205. Id. at 41.
206. Id.
In anticipation of that meeting, Paramount sent to the board members' homes
and offices a three-page document which detailed the "Conditions and Uncer-
tainties" of QVC's offer without any mention of the financial terms of that of-
fer.... That summary emphasized managements view that the QVC offer was
highly contingent .... One director, Mr. Pattison, testified that this document
created a negative impression of the QVC offer from the outset of the meeting:
"My reaction was that this was not what I consider a live offer ... [B]y the
time I got through reading this, I was very negative on the whole subject."
QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1257 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). Notably, the materials furnished to the Board by manage-
ment concentrated on the conditions of the QVC offer, "but omitted disclosure of several
similar conditions in the Viacom offer." Id.
207. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 41. The Board chose not to contact QVC regarding the
financing conditions apparently because they believed that to do so would violate the no-
shop provision of the Viacom merger agreement. Id.
208. QVC, 635 A.2d at 1258.
209. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51. Following the Delaware Supreme Court decision,
Paramount conducted a formal auction and for two months, Viacom and QVC continued
to raise their bids. Meredith M. Brown & Gary W. Kubek, The Paramount Duties of Di-
rectors, INSIGHTS, March 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Brown & Kubek]. Finally, after a five-
month struggle, Viacom won the "$10 billion takeover battle." Randall Smith, Wall
Street's Final Analysis: Might Made Right, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1994, at B1.
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conduct involved a change in control.210 Because such a change
can have a profound and lasting effect on the rights of share-
holders, the directors who negotiate and authorize it are sub-
jected to enhanced scrutiny.21 Under these circumstances, the
Paramount Board's "primary objective [was] to secure the trans-
action offering the best value reasonably available for the stock-
holders."2 2 In addition, the court required that the directors "be
especially diligent" in pursuing this goal, stating that the
Board's evaluative process must be informed.
213
Having established the appropriate standards, the court
measured the Paramount Board's actions and determined that
the Board breached their fiduciary duties because neither the
process nor the result was reasonable.214 The court was particu-
larly concerned with the "insufficient attention" paid by the
Board to the consequences of the defensive measures. 215 Once
QVC came into the picture, "[ilt should have been clear to the
Paramount Board that the [defensive measures] were impeding
the realization of the best value reasonably available to the Par-
amount stockholders."21 6 In view of the fact that the QVC bid ex-
ceeded that of Viacom by a face value of over $1 billion, the
210. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 42. The court explained that a change in control of a
corporation is important because it results in "a significant diminution in the voting
power of those who thereby become minority stockholders." Id. When shareholders are
reduced to minority status, their remaining investment "is subject to being 'cashed out'
at any time" by the new controlling shareholder(s). McBride, supra note 142, at 851. As
compensation for such a decrease in value, shareholders should receive a substantial per
share price as a "control premium" or protective measures that ensure that the share.
holders' equity interest will continue. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 42-43. Unless protective
guarantees are in place, long-term goals should not be pursued at the expense of imme-
diate per share gain. McBride, supra note 142, at 842. Since there were no "protective
provisions in the Viacom-Paramount transaction, the Paramount directors had an obliga-
tion to take the maximum advantage of the current opportunity to realize for the stock-
holders the best value reasonably available." Paramount, 637 A.2d at 43.
211. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 43.
212. Id. at 43-44 (citing Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
213. Id. at 44. Additionally, in a part of the decision not relevant here, the court
distinguished between Revlon and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), on the basis that the former involved "a sale of corporate control,"
whereas the latter did not since "Time would be owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffili-
ated stockholders both before and after the merger." Paramount, 637 A.2d at 46.
214. Paramount, 637 A!2d at 49.
215. Id. "The Stock Option Merger Agreement ... [was] potentially 'draconian,'...
the Termination Fee ... made Paramount less attractive to other bidders ... [and] the
No-Shop Provision inhibited the Paramount Board's ability to negotiate with other po-
tential bidders, particularly QVC which had already expressed an interest in Para-
mount." Id.
216. Id. at 50.
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court criticized the Paramount Board for adhering to their stra-
tegic vision of a merger with Viacom for two basic reasons: (1)
the change in control would render the Paramount Board unable
to* guarantee that the strategic vision would continue after con-
summation of the merger and (2) the fact that the directors had
failed to fully inform themselves about QVC's bid "deprived
their strategic vision of much of its credibility."
217
The Delaware Supreme Court decision produced the proper
result: corporate directors were justly found to have violated
their fiduciary duties to their shareholders. The means em-
ployed to reach that end, however, are curious. Instead of plac-
ing foremost emphasis on the Paramount Board's failure to as-
certain the substantive terms and benefits of both competing
bids, the court relied more heavily on the Board's failure to real-
ize the best value available to the shareholders. 218 This fact is
even more significant in light of the court's reluctance to rely on
Van Gorkom219 as the governing principle of the duty of care.
The most egregious deficiency on the part of the Paramount
Board was their failure even to ascertain the substantive terms
of the competing QVC offer.220 Any other breach by the Para-
mount Board was secondary to this failure, because logic dic-
tates that a corporate board that is uninformed cannot possibly
act in the best interests of its shareholders. That is not to say
that the court's discussion of breach of loyalty issues was inap-
propriate. By focusing on the impact that a change of control
has on the corporation's shareholders,22' the court clearly illus-
trated why the Board's failure to inform themselves was so
grievous. Failure to maximize shareholder profit, however,
should have been of lesser import.
When a corporate director fails to acquire the knowledge
reasonably available to him and necessary to his ability to criti-
cally evaluate a situation, he has violated the fiduciary duty of
care enunciated in Smith v. Van Gorkom.222 Rather than cite to
217. Id.
218. "[T]he clear message of Paramount ... is that the duty of a board in a sale or
change of control is to obtain 'the best value reasonably available to the stockholders."
Brown & Kubek, supra note 209, at 4 (noting that this principle is stated ten times in
the decision).
219. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The Paramount decision makes two cursory refer-
ences to Van Gorkom but engages in no analysis of the Van Gorkom decision. Para-
mount, 637 A.2d at 44, 50.
220. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 36.
221. "Once control has shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will have no lev-
erage in the future to demand another control premium." Id. at 43.
222. 488 A.2d 858.
919Fall 1996]
920 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
this explicit authority, the Delaware Supreme Court chose to
rely on Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.22s and the general princi-
ple that "directors must act in accordance with their fundamen-
tal duties of care and loyalty."224 Barkan does involve a change
of control and provides some new insight.225 The fact pattern
and the level of review, however, render the case of little rele-
vance to Paramount. The Barkan case arose as a shareholder
challenge to a class action settlement approved by the Delaware
Court of Chancery. The Delaware Supreme Court expressly
stated that its standard of review is limited to whether the
lower court has abused its discretionM2 6 and ruled that no such
223. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 43 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d
1279 (Del. 1989)). The Paramount court's reliance on Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), is a definite step in the right direction, but, nonetheless, a mere
substitute for the controlling Van Gorkom precedent.
In Cede, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Technicolor Board's failure to
satisfy its duty of care fell squarely under Van Gorkom. Id. at 367. Further, the court
specifically stated that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are "of equal and inde-
pendent significance." Id. Then, however, the court "noted approvingly" the Chancellor's
finding that the duty violated was that of Revlon. Ira N. Rosner, Paramount Lessons, 68
FLA. B. J. 51, 52 (1994) [hereinafter Rosner]. "The Chancellor wrote: . .. 'the due care
theory and the Revlon theory do not present two separate legal theories justifying share-
holder recovery .... [Bloth theories reduce to a claim that directors were inadequately
informed... ." Cede, 634 A.2d at 239 n.37 (citations omitted).
While it is true that the Delaware Supreme Court designated Revlon a due care
case after the fact, that characterization was not warranted by the Revlon facts. See
supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI. The Supreme Court's
strong Van Gorkom analysis in Cede is clouded by the Revlon reference which detracts
from the decision's due care analysis. But see William Prickett & Ronald A. Brown, Jr.,
Cede v. Technicolor: The Supreme Court Reilluminates Existing Lines of Delaware's Level
Playing Field, 19 DEL J. Coin. L. 593, 613 (1994) (maintaining that "the entire [Cede]
opinion is, in fact, a reaffirmation of Van Gorkom").
The 1993 Delaware Supreme Court Cede decision affirmed the Chancery Court deci-
sion in part, reversed it in part and remanded the case back to the Chancery Court. 634
A.2d at 345. On remand, the Chancery Court ruled that while the board's uninformed
process was flawed, the directors successfully proved that the transactions were entirely
fair to the shareholders. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch.
1994). In July 1995, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. 663 A.2d 1156
(Del. 1995).
224. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286, cited in Paramount, 637 A.2d at 43. "The court, per-
haps influenced by criticism that Delaware law in this area had become unpredictable,
took great pains to stress the consistency of its decisions in the Paramount case with the
court's prior rulings in Revlon, Macmillan, Time Warner and other takeover battles dur-
ing the 1980s!' Brown & Kubek, supra note 209, at 3.
225. One particular insight is worth mentioning: "Where a board has no reasonable
basis upon which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop restric-
tion gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall competing bids." Barkan,
567 A.2d at 1288.
226. Id. at 1284. "Because the Court of Chancery is in the best position to evaluate
the factors that support a settlement, we will not second-guess its business judgment
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abuse had occurred.227 Furthermore, the directors in Barkan fol-
lowed "a completely passive approach to acquiring ... knowl-
edge" and the Chancellor found the circumstances such that
they did not require any active pursuit of information. 228 While
Barkan characterizes the need for knowledge as "central to en-
lightened evaluation,"229 the determinative facts take the case
out of the Paramount arena.
One might ask what significance could attach to the Para-
mount court's choice of due care precedent. The answer, plenty.
The facts of Smith v. Van Gorkom,23° as found by the Delaware
Supreme Court, were shocking.231 Recall, however, the plethora
of criticisms charging that the Supreme Court completely mis-
construed the facts.232 The propriety, or lack thereof, of the Su-
preme Court's factual findings is of limited significance. More
important are the result of the Supreme Court's findings and
the subsequent controversy that surrounded the decision. In the
final analysis, the Trans Union Board was held financially ac-
countable for its failure to question management in the context
of a sale of control. Few cheered the result, but the public ma-
jority condemned it, hurling verbal assaults of judicial
incompetence.
23
When faced with the same situation nine years later, in
Paramount, the Delaware Supreme Court took the easy way out.
Relying on precedents much less explosive than Van Gorkom,
the Paramount court managed to hold the Paramount Board lia-
ble for breaching their duty of care, while tempering the impact
of that analysis with an examination of the duty of loyalty.23
4 Of
upon appeal." Id.
227. Id. at 1288.
228. Id
229. Id. at 1287.
230. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
231. Rosner, supra note 223, at 52 & n.14 (noting, among other things, that Van
Gorkom never read the merger agreement before signing it, that the price suggested by
Van Gorkom was based upon bearable debt service, not valuation and that the short-
lived two-hour meeting resulted in approval of the transaction, despite the fact that
most directors were not even aware in advance of the meeting's agenda).
232. See supra notes 119, 120, and 126-128. The incongruity between the two Van
Gorkom decisions is apparent from the opening lines of the Delaware Supreme Court de-
cision. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864. While the Chancellor found that the Trans Union
Board had "acted in an informed manner," the Supreme Court found that ruling "clearly
erroneous." Id.
233. See supra Part IH.
234. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43-51
(Del. 1993). Recall the traditional phenomenon that courts were concerned only with the
duty of loyalty). See supra note 8. Van Gorkom was the case that originated judicial re-
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course, such a juxtaposition of these duties was made possible
only by post-Revlon manipulations that imposed a duty of care
upon the loyalty-laden Revlon duties. 2 5 By creating this dual
duty approach to the Paramount Board's actions, the Paramount
court diminished the significance of the Board's failure to ques-
tion management.
VI. "IT'S NOT POLITE TO ASK QUESTIONS"
236
Delaware law vests corporate directors with the power to
manage or direct the management of the corporation.237 It is too
often the case, however, that management manages the corpora-
tion, while the board of directors merely grants approval.23 8 The
trend over the last few years is toward board activism, toward
waking up boards "to confront inept, ossified managements,
challenging them either to change or depart.239 That this "new
activist era"m has not yet reached the Delaware Supreme Court
view based on gross negligence principles. But see Russell B. Stevenson, Jr. & David L.
Haselkorn, Paramount Communications v. QVC Network and the Fiduciary Duties of Di-
rectors of Public Companies That are the Subject of Merger or Takeover Offers, C951
A.L.I-A.BA 263, 269 (1994) ("The case rests primarily on the court's holding that the di-
rectors failed in their procedural obligations").
235. See supra notes 177-88. Had the Delaware Supreme Court desired to effect a
change in the law and subject profit maximizers to procedural requirements, it could
have so ruled when facts implicating both care and loyalty issues came before them. Its
chosen course of action, however, in subsequently adding due care requirements to Rev-
lon duties severely reduces the impact of the duty to become informed, because no facts
in Revlon give substance to that part of the holding. But see Cunningham & Yablon,
supra note 8, at 1594 (asserting that Technicolor and QVC represent a movement toward
a single standard and away from the separate duty of care and duty of loyalty
approach).
236. Magnet, supra note 1, at 86.
237. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See supra note 33 for the text of this
statute.
238. The structural makeup of board positions has been a principle reason for this
phenomenon. Traditionally, the CEO also acts as the chairman of the board and thus as
the figurehead of corporate operations. See Tanya Cordrey, Who Rules the Boardroom?,
INT'L MGMT., June 1994, at 32 [hereinafter Cordrey]. With this system in place, a direc-
tor's ability to determine and/or respond to CEO incompetence is problematic at best.
See id. A crisis is generally required to incite the board to confront management. Wid-
der, supra note 5, § 7, at 1. But even '[when a company hits a major problem, the
board is loathe to act if acting means it must disagree with the strategies of the CEO.'"
Cordrey, supra at 33.
239. Paul Ingrassia, Memo to Board: Management Isn't Always Wrong, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 23, 1994, at A14 [hereinafter Ingrassia]. Activist institutional investors and other
experts "predict... a shift by corporate America to smaller, more independent and di-
verse boards. . . " Marlene Givant Star, Governance Now a Priority, PENSIONS & INV.,
Nov. 1, 1993, at 28 [hereinafter Star].
240. Ingrassia, supra note 239, at A14.
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is evidenced by the Paramount court's refusal to measure the
Paramount Board's deficiencies by the stringent procedural stan-
dards of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
241
In many American corporations, the functioning of the
board of directors needs great improvement. Many directors pas-
sively accept that which occurs around them and fail to assert
themselves. 242 One reason for this phenomenon is that passivity
has been the boardroom etiquette for decades. 24 "Another factor
that makes it difficult for directors to fulfill their responsibilities
to shareholders is the 'golden rule' of the boardroom. Many
outside directors are 'either current or past chief executive of-
ficers or are on a CEO path' .... 'It's kind of a good old boy
network"244 where "[backs get scratched."24 Lack of informa-
tion is another cause of board "impotence,"24 in that the direc-
tors must often rely for information on those individuals whose
conduct they are supposed to be monitoring. Lack of incentive is
an additional reason for board "snoozing."247 In many companies,
241. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
242. "WVe always believed our role was to be supportive of management .... Quiet
counseling is very important to these chiefs. They don't need confrontation in public...
.'" Widder, supra note 5, at C1 (quoting James H. Evans, former chairman of Union Pa-
cific Corp. and director of GM Corp., AT&T Co. and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.).
Delaware Supreme Court Judge Andrew G. T. Moore H characterized Evans' outlook as
"'pre Van Gorkom philosophy' . . . Post Van Gorkom. .. the world [has] changed." Id.
Unfortunately, the Van Gorkom decision did not eradicate from corporate boards this
type of attitude and the Paramount decision evidences the Delaware Supreme Court's re-
luctance to wipe it out.
243. Magnet, supra note 1, at 86.
Unmindful of th[e] rule of etiquette [that asking questions is impolite], a direc-
tor who asked about press criticisms of one corporate giant's new product re-
calls that he drew looks of such shocked disbelief that he felt as if he had
belched at the dinner table .... [When at] Nabisco Brands [a] director...
couldn't restrain himself from blurting out that anyone would be preferable to
the candidate named to succeed [the company's] president. Privately, he be-
lieved, his fellow outside directors shared this judgment. "Nobody spoke to me
at the next two board meetings," [he] says. "It was a no-no. Socially, I'd pulled
a tremendous gaffe"
Id.
244. Widder, supra note 5, at 8 (quoting Lowell E. Sachnoff of the Chicago law firm
Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein). In their capacity as outside directors, these CEO-types
treat the CEO and chairman of the board as they wish to be treated by their own
boards. Id.
245. Redirecting Directors, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 19, 19 [hereinafter
Redirecting].
246. Id. A May 1994 survey by KPMG Peat Marwick found that many outside direc-
tors are not provided with the information that they need to perform their duties. Cor-
drey, supra note 238, at 33.
247. Magnet, supra note 1, at 86. See also Widder, supra note 5, at 8 (MThere is lit-
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any particular shareholder seldom owns even one percent of the
outstanding shares, and thus is much more abstract to the di-
rectors than the very real CEO, with whom it is necessary for
the director to get along.
248
Further, the respective personalities of board members have
a significant impact on the board's functioning.249 "'The main
problem is that boards are leaderless horses. Unless there's a di-
rector who wants to get in trouble, how do you start?'- 250 To get
such mischievous directors on the board requires the involve-
ment of the CEO, but the present system is not the best vehicle
for such changes, because those companies that have the great-
est need for active directors are run by CEOs who do not pos-
sess the self-confidence to appoint them.
251
Board activists offer many suggestions to combat poor direc-
tor performance. Stock ownership by directors is one way to
bring directors more in touch with the interests of sharehold-
ers.252 Procedurally, board members must do "their homework-
that is, helping management set strategy and then closely moni-
tle financial or legal pressure to perform effectively."); Redirecting, supra note 245, at 19
("[T]he boards of directors [that shareholders] appoint to [run companies] for them are
tempted to help the managers, not the owners"). Even if directors did have the neces-
sary incentive to take action against poor management, such is not an easy task. Id.
("Like prime ministers, incumbent managers, no matter how bad, are hard to get rid of.
Worse, it is hard to spot that they should be ousted until their company is in deep
trouble.").
248. Magnet, supra note 1, at 86 ("[Tlhey don't have proper incentives to take the
hard actions."). But see Star, supra note 239 for a discussion of the successes achieved
by institutional investors seeking to promote activist boards.
249. Magnet, supra note 1, at 86.
250. Id. at 86. One director noted:
"I was on that board for about six months, and I said to myself, 'Jesus, these
executives don't know what the hell they're doing.' And I got on my airplane
and went to see another director, the head of a big bank. He said, 'You're right
- they don't know what the hell they're doing.' And I said, 'You've been on
that board for five or six years. Why don't you do something about it?' He said,
"Well, we're waiting for some young tiger to come along. And here you are."
Id. at 87.
251. Id. at 88. Magnet describes a rare example of a newly-named CEO in a family-
run business whose appointment was followed by a serious fall in profits and stock val-
ues. Id. at 87. Board members cornered the CEO with demanding and direct questions.
Id. Rather than responding defensively, the CEO openly admitted his need for assis-
tance and together they explored the issues and alternatives. Id.
252. Cordrey, supra note 235, at 33. But see Joann S. Lublin & Christina Duff, How
Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1995, at B1, B2 (explaining
an ousted Westinghouse CEO's view that it is unwise to have directors who are moti-
vated solely by their wallets).
Fall 1996] ASKING QUESTIONS IN BOARDROOM 925
toring its execution."2 3 A director nominating committee2 4 and
corporate board composed of outside, non-management directors
can help to ensure higher levels of independence. 255 Written
CEO and management job descriptions and regularly scheduled
written evaluations open up the lines of communication.256 A rel-
atively new concept, director self-evaluation is also useful on
both the board and individual level.25 7 An organized retreat for
board members can provide an opportunity for prolonged mean-
ingful exchange, something rarely accomplished at a rushed
board meeting.258 Intense training of new directors is another
time consuming, but beneficial program.2 9 Household Interna-
tional presents each new director with a detailed reference book
covering various facets of the corporation and follows up with
one-on-one review with the top executives responsible for each
253. Ingrassia, supra note 239, at A14 (contending that when such homework is
performed directors will be agreeing with management, rather than disagreeing with
them). Outside counsel to the General Motors directors, New York attorney Ira Millstein
refers to a prepared board as a "Certifying Board," since they are well equipped to "cer-
tify to shareholders . . . and others that the company is on the right track." Id. The
board of directors of Zenith Electronics Corp. has tightened control and tracks a variety
of items, "Trom sales to liquidity." Richard A. Melcher & Judith H. Dobrzynski, "A Short
Leash' at Zenith, Bus. WK, Jan. 31, 1994, at 31.
254. In addition, these committees should not include the corporation's "major sup-
pliers, officials of nonprofit organizations that receive substantial donations from the
corporations and the CEO's close friends" Joann S. Lublin, How to Keep Directors' Eyes
on the CEO, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1994, at BI [hereinafter Lublin].
255. Magnet, supra note 1, at 89.
Above all, CEOs need directors who will help keep them from getting trapped
within the closed worlds of their own companies. Never having to stand in line,
flying on your own jet to your own limo waiting at your own company's own
private hangar, it's easy to lose touch with certain realities.... [A CEO is] just
too all-powerful. If [he is] not careful, [he] wind[s] up sitting at the top of this
organization getting fed back only the things [the directors] think [he] want[s]
to hear.
Id. at 88.
256. Lublin, supra note 254, at Bi; see also Magnet, supra note 1, at 88. In mid
1994, the National Association of Corporate Directors published recommendations to
help directors better monitor chief executives. Lublin, supra note 254, at B1. "A job
description would help set performance objectives ... and the annual evaluation should
cover financial results as well as qualitative measures, such as integrity, vision, leader-
ship and succession planning." Id. One job description that included "'getting the best
thinking of each board member' and 'seeing that the board is kept fully informed'" be-
longed to a chairman whose annual bonus was 30% dependent upon the appraisal by fel--
low directors. Magnet, supra note 1, at 88-89.
257. Lublin, supra note 254, at Bi.
258. See Ada Demb, A Framework for a Board Retreat, DIRECTORS & BDs., Fall 1994,
at 12.
259. Cyrus F. Freidheim, Jr., Preparing Your New Directors, DIRECTORS & Bus., Win-
ter 1995, at 27.
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facet. 260 Also, interestingly, Household International invites the
executive assistants of each new director to spend a get-
acquainted day at the corporation's offices.
261
A movement toward board activism is not without its diffi-
culties. Additional resources, staff and time commitments from
directors will be required to perform these new functions.
262
More significant is the concern that "as directors become more
intimately involved with the management of the corporation,
they would lose their status as outsiders."26 3 Further, because di-
rectors are routinely encouraged to become activists, some board
members might overreact and wreak havoc on the board.264 De-
spite these concerns, board activism is a step in the right direc-
tion and should be pursued by corporations and enforced by
courts as an alternative to the traditional board ignorance
approach.
CONCLUSION
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.2
6
1
provided the Delaware Supreme Court with the perfect opportu-
nity to poignantly reaffirm the corporate director's fiduciary
duty to inform himself under Smith v. Van Gorkom.26 The facts
of Paramount clearly warranted due care analysis, since the
Paramount directors virtually ignored the extremely competitive
QVC bid.267 The court did hold that the Paramount Board vio-
lated its duty of care, but that ruling's impact was unnecessarily
limited because: (1) rather than steadfastly relying on Van
Gorkom, the most on-point and applicable precedent, the court
cited less controversial, and less applicable authority; and (2)
rather than relying solely or predominantly on the Board's fail-
ure to become adequately informed, the court examined profit
maximization duties under Revlon. The Paramount court was
certainly concerned with the Paramount Board's failure to be-
come informed, but that concern should have been the control-
ling, if not exclusive, basis for enjoining the Board's action. The
260. Id. at 28.
261. Id.
262. James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors-Inside is Out, 49 Bus. LAw. 1707,
1729 (1994).
263. Id.
264. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Activist Boards, Yes. Panicky Boards, No, Bus. Wix, Dec.
28, 1992, at 40.
265. 637 A-2d 34 (Del. 1993).
266. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
267. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 41.
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Paramount court neglected an excellent opportunity to highlight,
and advocate for, board activism. Consequently, corporate direc-
tors are reminded, that while moderately interested in the
board's behavior, the Delaware Supreme Court will invariably
allow quietude, snoozing and ignorant politeness.

